Cuban Border Entrants and Form I-220A: What Happens If ICE Detains You Again?

For Cuban immigrants in South Florida, one document has generated enormous confusion:

Form I-220A — Order of Release on Recognizance.

Thousands of immigrants have entered the United States, been taken into DHS custody, and later released with immigration documents permitting them to live outside detention while their cases proceed.

Many Cubans released on an I-220A subsequently obtained work permits, established homes, obtained employment, raised families, filed asylum applications and attended Immigration Court hearings.

Some have lived in the United States for years.

Then comes a frightening question:

What happens if ICE arrests that person again?

Can the person obtain bond?

Can an Immigration Judge order release?

Does the original I-220A mean the person was “paroled” into the United States?

And for a Cuban national, does an I-220A satisfy the parole requirement associated with adjustment under the Cuban Adjustment Act?

These questions sound related, but legally they are not necessarily the same.

First: What Is an I-220A?

Form I-220A is an Order of Release on Recognizance.

In practical terms, DHS has released the person from physical immigration custody subject to conditions rather than requiring continued detention.

A person holding an I-220A may understandably say:

“Immigration paroled me.”

But immigration law uses the word “parole” in several different ways, and those differences have significant legal consequences.

Conditional Parole Is Not Necessarily INA § 212(d)(5)(A) Parole

This distinction became particularly important for Cubans because of Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez, 28 I&N Dec. 747 (BIA 2023).

The BIA held that release on conditional parole under INA § 236(a)(2)(B) is legally distinct from humanitarian or significant-public-benefit parole under INA § 212(d)(5)(A).

The Board expressly distinguished release on recognizance under § 236 from parole under § 212(d)(5).

That distinction matters tremendously under the Cuban Adjustment Act.

Why Cubans Care About the Difference

The Cuban Adjustment Act provides a special path through which qualifying Cuban natives or citizens may obtain lawful permanent resident status if statutory requirements are satisfied.

One important requirement historically involves having been “inspected and admitted or paroled” into the United States.

Therefore, a Cuban immigrant may ask:

“If DHS released me on an I-220A, wasn’t I paroled?”

After Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez, the answer cannot simply be yes.

The BIA held that conditional parole under § 236(a)(2)(B) is legally different from § 212(d)(5)(A) parole.

Thus, the word “parole” should never be used casually in analyzing an I-220A case.

Now Add a Second ICE Arrest

Consider this hypothetical.

José is a citizen of Cuba.

He crosses the southern border and is apprehended by immigration authorities. DHS processes him, places him into removal proceedings and eventually releases him with an I-220A Order of Release on Recognizance.

José moves to South Florida.

Over the next several years he:

• obtains employment authorization;
• works continuously;
• pays taxes;
• lives at the same address;
• marries;
• has family in the United States;
• files an application for asylum;
• attends every Immigration Court hearing;
• commits no crimes; and
• receives a future date for his Individual Hearing.

José believes he has done everything the government asked him to do.

Then ICE arrests him again.

His family asks:

“Can we pay a bond and bring him home?”

A few years ago, many practitioners might immediately have focused upon § 236(a) and the traditional Matter of Guerra bond factors.

Today, the analysis has become considerably more complicated.

Matter of Q. Li Changed the Detention Analysis

In Matter of Q. Li, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), the BIA considered the detention framework applicable to an applicant for admission apprehended while arriving in the United States.

The Board held that an applicant for admission arrested and detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States—whether or not at a designated port of entry—and subsequently placed into removal proceedings is detained under INA § 235(b).

This language matters for people apprehended after crossing between ports of entry.

The Board rejected the argument that § 236(a) necessarily controlled simply because removal proceedings were underway.

That has enormous consequences because § 235(b) detention does not carry the same ordinary Immigration Judge bond procedure as § 236(a).

Matter of Yajure Hurtado Went Further

Later in 2025, the BIA issued Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

The Board addressed whether an Immigration Judge could conduct a bond proceeding for a person present in the United States without admission.

The BIA concluded that Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or grant bond to persons falling within the relevant § 235(b)(2)(A) detention framework.

One particularly important feature of Yajure Hurtado was the respondent’s argument concerning DHS’s own paperwork.

The respondent argued that DHS had issued documents suggesting detention under § 236(a), including an arrest warrant and custody determination.

The Board nevertheless focused upon the statutory framework rather than treating DHS’s paperwork as controlling the Immigration Judge’s jurisdiction.

This produces a major practical problem for an I-220A holder.

“But ICE Already Released Me Once”

That is a logical reaction.

José may say:

“ICE arrested me at the border. ICE decided I didn’t need to remain detained. ICE gave me an I-220A. I have followed every rule for three years. Why can’t the Immigration Judge release me again?”

The answer illustrates the difference between DHS release authority and Immigration Judge bond jurisdiction.

The fact that DHS previously released someone does not necessarily establish that an Immigration Judge has statutory authority to conduct a § 236(a) bond hearing after ICE takes the person back into custody.

That threshold question must now be analyzed under Q. Li, Yajure Hurtado, and subsequent precedent.

The BIA Reinforced the Rule in 2026

In Matter of N-A-G-C-, 29 I&N Dec. 662 (BIA 2026), the Board confronted an Immigration Judge who had exercised § 236(a) custody jurisdiction and granted a $4,000 bond.

The respondent had significant equities: he had previously been designated an unaccompanied alien child and had an approved Special Immigrant Juvenile petition.

The Immigration Judge also found that he did not present a danger.

Nevertheless, the BIA concluded that these circumstances did not give the Immigration Judge § 236(a) authority where the § 235(b) detention framework controlled.

This decision reinforces an uncomfortable but important principle:

The strength of the person’s equities does not itself determine whether the Immigration Judge possesses jurisdiction.

What If the Cuban Has Absolutely No Criminal Record?

That fact remains extremely important—but perhaps not for the reason the family initially expects.

Suppose José has:

No arrests.
No convictions.
No pending criminal charges.
No history of violence.
No immigration-court absences.

Those facts would ordinarily be powerful evidence against dangerousness and flight risk in a discretionary § 236(a) bond case.

But if the Immigration Judge lacks bond jurisdiction because José is being detained under § 235(b), those favorable facts cannot themselves manufacture § 236(a) jurisdiction.

This is one of the most important lessons for I-220A holders.

Being a good candidate for bond is different from being legally eligible for an Immigration Judge to grant bond.

What If the Cuban Does Have a Criminal Record?

Then the case becomes even more complicated.

Counsel must analyze several separate issues.

First, determine whether the criminal history affects the underlying asylum application or another requested form of relief.

Second, determine whether a particular conviction creates an inadmissibility or removability issue.

Third, determine whether the offense affects the detention framework.

Fourth, if discretionary release is legally available, determine how the arrest or conviction affects dangerousness.

The existence of a criminal record therefore should never be analyzed simply by asking:

“Was he convicted?”

The actual statute, disposition and circumstances matter.

What Does Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez Mean for the Cuban Adjustment Act?

This deserves separate treatment because custody law and adjustment eligibility should not be mixed together.

In Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez, the respondents did not dispute that DHS had released them on their own recognizance under § 236 rather than through the § 212(d)(5) parole procedures.

The BIA held that conditional parole under § 236(a)(2)(B) is legally distinct from humanitarian parole under § 212(d)(5)(A).

Accordingly, practitioners should be extremely cautious about telling an I-220A holder:

“Your I-220A is automatically parole for Cuban Adjustment Act purposes.”

That proposition is inconsistent with Cabrera-Fernandez where the release is § 236 conditional parole.

But Doesn’t Q. Li Create an Interesting Tension?

It certainly creates an important analytical issue.

On one hand, Cabrera-Fernandez addressed people released on recognizance under § 236 and held that conditional parole was not § 212(d)(5)(A) parole.

On the other hand, Q. Li later emphasized that applicants for admission apprehended while arriving fall within § 235(b)’s detention framework and distinguished that framework from § 236(a).

That raises difficult questions concerning people whom DHS historically processed and released using I-220A documentation.

But lawyers and immigrants should resist making the leap from that tension to the conclusion that Q. Li automatically transformed every historical I-220A into § 212(d)(5)(A) parole.

The detention question and the Cuban Adjustment Act eligibility question remain analytically distinct.

Supreme Court Guidance on Applicants for Admission and Parole

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the statutory distinction between admission and parole.

Most recently, in Blanche v. Muk Choi Lau, No. 25-429 (June 23, 2026), the Court discussed § 1225’s framework for applicants for admission and the Government’s authority to parole an applicant rather than formally admit the person while admissibility remains unresolved.

The decision provides useful current Supreme Court context for understanding why “physically inside the United States” does not necessarily mean “admitted” under immigration law.

That distinction is particularly important in border-entry cases.

If the Immigration Judge Cannot Grant Bond, Is There Nothing an Attorney Can Do?

Not necessarily.

This is where the distinction between Immigration Judge authority and DHS authority becomes critical.

INA § 212(d)(5)(A) authorizes DHS, in its discretion and on a case-by-case basis, to parole certain applicants for admission temporarily for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.

Therefore, the absence of ordinary Immigration Judge bond jurisdiction should not automatically be translated into:

“There is absolutely no legal mechanism for release.”

Instead, counsel should determine what release authority DHS retains under the applicable statute and whether the particular circumstances support a request for discretionary release or parole.

In appropriate cases, federal habeas or constitutional litigation may also require analysis, although such litigation is separate from an ordinary Immigration Court bond proceeding and depends upon the specific facts, duration of detention and controlling federal law.

A Practical Example

Return to José.

He is Cuban.

He crossed the border.

He received an I-220A.

He has lived in Florida for several years.

He has employment authorization.

His asylum application is pending.

His Individual Hearing is scheduled.

He has never been arrested.

He has attended every Immigration Court hearing.

ICE detains him.

His lawyer should not begin by promising:

“We will get you a bond hearing.”

Instead, counsel should reconstruct the immigration history.

Question 1: How exactly did José enter?

Was he encountered at a port of entry or after crossing between ports?

Question 2: What did DHS issue?

Review the I-220A, NTA, custody documents, charging documents, any parole documentation and the complete A-file where available.

Question 3: Was José ever granted § 212(d)(5)(A) parole?

Do not assume that an I-220A establishes this.

Question 4: What statute does DHS now contend authorizes detention?

Is DHS relying upon § 235(b), § 236(a), § 236(c), or another provision?

Question 5: Does the Immigration Judge have custody jurisdiction?

Analyze Q. Li, Yajure Hurtado, N-A-G-C- and any controlling federal-court authority.

Question 6: If there is no IJ bond jurisdiction, what DHS release authority remains?

Evaluate parole and any other legally available mechanism based upon the client’s circumstances.

Question 7: What happens to the asylum case?

Continue preparing the underlying case. Detention does not, by itself, extinguish the pending asylum application.

The I-220A Does Not Mean the Asylum Case Is Over

If José is detained again, his family may understandably focus entirely upon getting him out of custody.

But the underlying removal case remains critically important.

The attorney may simultaneously be dealing with:

1. the detention issue;
2. the asylum application;
3. any alternative relief from removal; and
4. for a Cuban national, possible adjustment issues under the Cuban Adjustment Act.

Each has its own statutory requirements.

The Most Important Lesson for Cuban I-220A Holders

An I-220A case cannot safely be analyzed using a single sentence such as:

“You were paroled.”

The lawyer must ask:

Paroled under what statutory authority?

Likewise, after a second ICE arrest, the question cannot simply be:

“Do you have good facts for bond?”

The lawyer must first ask:

Does the Immigration Judge have statutory authority to grant bond?

The BIA’s recent decisions have made those distinctions increasingly important.

Bottom Line

A Cuban national may have entered the United States, received an I-220A, lived here for years, obtained employment authorization, filed asylum, attended every Immigration Court hearing, maintained a family and employment, and never committed a crime.

Those are extraordinarily important facts.

But they do not automatically establish Immigration Judge bond jurisdiction after a later ICE arrest.

Following Matter of Q. Li, Matter of Yajure Hurtado, and Matter of N-A-G-C-, counsel must carefully identify the statutory detention authority before filing an ordinary § 236(a) bond request.

And following Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez, a Cuban holding an I-220A should not automatically assume that release on recognizance constitutes § 212(d)(5)(A) parole for Cuban Adjustment Act purposes.

The Rule to Remember

For an I-220A holder, there are really two different questions:

Custody:
If ICE arrests me again, who has legal authority to release me?

Immigration status:
What legal effect did my original release have upon asylum, parole, admission, and possible Cuban Adjustment Act eligibility?

The answers may not be the same.

This article provides general educational information about federal immigration law and is not legal advice. Immigration detention, asylum, parole and Cuban Adjustment Act cases are highly fact-specific, and the law in this area continues to develop.